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1. Introduction 
Reorganization is one of the two alternatives open to an insolvent corporation 
under the Bankruptcy Code. A bankrupt corporation may file either for liqui-
dation under Chapter 7 or for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Upon a filing for liquidation, a court immediately appoints a 
trustee to sell the firm's assets, either piecemeal or as a going concern, to 
outside buyers. The proceeds from this sale are divided among those who 
have rights against the corporation, with the division made according to the 
ranking of these rights by legal priority. 
The firm may go instead into Chapter 11 , under which the firm can be 
"reorganized." In reorganization there is no sale to third parties. Rather, there 
is a "hypothetical sale" of the firm to the existing "participants" -all those 
who hold claims or rights against the insolvent company. These participants 
surrender their claims and rights in exchange for claims and rights against the 
new corporation. For example, a bankrupt company may emerge from re-
organization with all its debt canceled and with the former debtholders hold-
ing some or all of the equity of the reorganized company. 
We wish to thank Oliver Hart, Marcel Kahan, Kevin Kaiser, Louis Kaplow, Roberta Romano, 
Steve Shavell, Jeff Zwiebel, two anonymous referees, and participants in workshops at Harvard 
and M.I.T. for helpful comments and the John M. Olin Foundation for financial support. Lucian 
Bebchuk's work has been supported also by the National Science Foundation. 
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If the court supervising a reorganization could observe the value of the 
reorganized firm, it would allocate that value among the participants accord-
ing to the legal priority of their claims. For example, consider a company that 
has equityholders and that owes debtholders $200, and suppose that the court 
observes that the value of the reorganized company will be $150; in this case, 
the court would order that all of the reorganized company's securities be given 
to the debtholders, and none be given to the equityholders. Below we will use 
the term "contractual right" to mean that which a class would receive if the 
bankruptcy court could observe the firm's value and distributed it among the 
classes according to the initial contracts, that is, strictly in the order of the legal 
priority of their claims. 
Because a court cannot determine accurately an objective figure for this 
value, however, the law leaves the division of the reorganized company's 
value to a process of bargaining among the classes of participants. Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, each class of equityholders and debtholders whose interests 
are impaired must vote to approve a reorganization plan, which would include 
a division of value. The approval by a class requires a certain majority of the 
class members to vote in favor of the plan. As is generally believed by 
participants in reorganization and as will be shown in this article, the outcome 
of this bargaining process often diverges from the contractual rights of the 
classes. 
In Section 2 of this article, we develop a sequential bargaining model of the 
negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the 
expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal 
rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value each class will 
receive and what factors give each class an advantage or a disadvantage in the 
bargaining process. We also compare the share of the reorganized firm's value 
that each class obtains under the existing legal regime with the contractual 
right of that class. 1 
The critical features of the situation that we model are as follows. Once an 
insolvent company files for reorganization under Chapter 11, an "automatic 
stay" prevents debtholders from seizing the company's assets as long as the 
company is in Chapter 11. If there is no agreement on a reorganization plan, 
eventually the supervising court would convert the bankruptcy proceedings to 
a Chapter 7 sale. For the debtholders to obtain any value before such a 
1. In spite of the growing interest by economists in corporate reorganization, little work has 
been done thus far to model bargaining under Chapter 11. Brown analyzed this bargaining, but 
his model does not include certain important features of the process that we seek to incorporate. 
First, whereas time plays no role in Brown's model, we analyze the implications of the critical 
fact that upon filing for Chapter 11 a company may be kept in Chapter 11 , protected from 
creditors, for some time. As our model shows, the bargaining is shaped by the possibility of such 
a delay, because the value available for division may well change over time as a result of the 
realization of uncertainty and the company's incurring financial distress costs. Moreover, whereas 
in Brown's model no class can make many offers, we develop a sequential bargaining model in 
which each class can make many offers during the Chapter 11 period. 
In surveying past work, note should be made of the related literature about debt renegotiation 
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conversion, however, the two classes, equityholders and debtholders, must 
agree on a division of value (i.e., on a reorganization plan). 
If the parties do not agree immediately, and the company remains in Chap-
ter 11 for some time, then the value available for division may well change, 
for two reasons. First, the company would incur some "financial distress 
costs," to be discussed later, which would reduce its value. Second, uncer-
tainty will be realized: random shocks may increase or decrease the firm's 
value. Furthermore, if the two classes ultimately do not reach agreement, and 
the assets are sold under Chapter 7, such a sale might sometimes involve a 
loss of value. These potential consequences of the parties' failure to reach 
agreement are important elements of our model, because they provide the 
background against which the parties would decide which offers to make or 
accept. 
Empirical studies of corporate reorganization (e.g., Eberhart, Moore, and 
Roenfeldt; Weiss; Franks and Torous) confirm that Chapter 11 often enables 
equityholders to obtain a share of the value of the reorganized company even 
when that value is less than sufficient to cover debtholders' claims. The 
debtholders often agree to plans giving the equityholders a share of this value 
even when the debtholders are not paid in full. Our model identifies and 
analyzes three sources of the equityholders' ability to obtain value and the 
parameters that determine how much value they will obtain. 
As will be shown, Chapter 11 gives equityholders the ability to obtain 
value, even though the company is insolvent. The fact that their consent is 
necessary for a division of value enables equityholders to obtain value for 
three reasons. The first two reasons arise from the ability of the equityholders 
to delay the adoption of a reorganization plan from the beginning of the 
Chapter 11 period to a later date. First, if equityholders delay agreement, 
there may be a favorable resolution of uncertainty that would cause the value 
of the firm to exceed the value of its debt. Thus, the equityholders have an 
"option value," and to forgo it they must be compensated by the agreed 
distribution of value. Second, if the equityholders withhold their consent and 
thereby delay agreement, the company will be expected to incur "financial 
distress costs" that will erode the value that debtholders can expect to receive. 
Thus, the equityholders' consent to a division of value can save the firm 
"financial distress costs," and therefore they can obtain a share of these 
(see, e.g., Bergman and Callen; Hart and Moore, 1989; Giammarino; and Webb). (Of these 
articles, the closest to ours in modeling approach is that of Bergman and Callen, who also use a 
sequential bargaining model, though not one in which the firm value may fluctuate during the 
bargaining period as a result of the realization of uncertainty.) Debt renegotiation prior to formal 
bankruptcy proceedings, however, differs from that within such proceedings. Our focus, of 
course, is on bargaining within Chapter 11 with special emphasis on how the legal rules of 
Chapter 11 shape this process. 
Finally, after developing our model, we learned about an independent effort to develop a 
sequential bargaining model of Chapter 11 by Baird and Picker. While they share our approach, 
their model differs substantially from ours; in particular, in their model the company's value is 
assumed not to change during the Chapter 11 period. 
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savings. The fraction of these savings that they obtain depends upon the rules 
that govern the Chapter 11 bargaining. In particular, the equityholders in 
effect have an exclusive power to propose reorganization plans for a period of 
time, which increases the fraction of the savings of "financial distress costs" 
that the equityholders can capture. 
The third reason that the equityholders can obtain value (even when the 
value of the reorganized firm is insufficient to pay the debt in full) arises when 
the parties expect a Chapter 7 sale to entail a loss of value. In this case, the 
equityholders' consent to a division of value is necessary to avoid this loss. 
Therefore, they can obtain a fraction of the value gained by avoiding a Chap-
ter 7 sale. 
The model in Section 2 reveals how much each of the elements descrioed 
above contributes to the value that equityholders will receive. Comparative 
statics analysis is also presented in Section 2. In particular, the amount that 
equityholders will receive tends to increase with (i) the volatility of the value 
of the company's assets, (ii) the extent to which reorganization imposes 
"financial distress costs," (iii) the length of the reorganization period, (iv) the 
length of the period during which the equityholders have the exclusive right to 
make offers, (v) the extent to which liquidation imposes a loss in value, and 
(vi) the extent to which the value of the company's assets covers the com-
pany's debts. As will be discussed, these results provide several testable 
implications of the model. 
Finally, concluding remarks on some issues for further research are offered 
in Section 3. While we focus on the positive analysis of the bargaining process 
under Chapter 11, this analysis is a prerequisite for a normative analysis of the 
efficiency costs of Chapter 11. Accordingly, in Section 3, we discuss the 
implications of the model for the welfare effects of Chapter 11. 
2. The Model 
2.1 Framework of Analysis 
We consider a company with one class of equity and one class of debt that files 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Let V be the value of the company's assets 
at the time of filing. 2 Upon filing for bankruptcy, the company owes an 
amount D, where D > V. Thus, the value of the assets is insufficient to cover 
the debt in full. (In Section 2. 7, we discuss how the model can be extended to 
the case in which D :::; V.) 
The firm is to emerge from the reorganization with an all-equity structure or 
some other capital structure that avoids the "financial distress costs" to be 
described below. Under Chapter 11 , the corporate reorganization process ends 
when the various classes of investors accept a plan including a division of 
value. If the parties fail to agree on a reorganization plan, the supervising 
court would eventually convert the bankruptcy proceedings to a Chapter 7 
liquidation (usually following a petition by creditors). For concreteness, we 
2. More specifically, Vis the value that the company would have if its capital structure were 
such that the firm is not expected to incur the "financial distress costs" to be described below. 
Bargaining in Corporate Reorganization 257 
assume that if the parties fail to reach an agreement within a time period T, the 
company will be liquidated. The firm remains in Chapter 11 reorganization 
until time t = T unless the parties reach agreement before then. 3 
For an agreement on the distribution of value, one class must propose a 
reorganization plan, and then both classes must accept it. The Bankruptcy 
Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, however, include certain notice and hearing 
requirements that introduce a delay of at least 25 days between offer and 
response. 4 In this respect, bargaining in the reorganization context differs 
from that in other contexts, in which each round of bargaining-an offer and 
the response to it-can take a very short period of time. 
Let Lit be the length of one round of bargaining, that is, the time required 
until a proposed reorganization plan can be accepted or rejected under Chapter 
11. Let n = T/Ltt (assumed for simplicity to be an integer greater than 1) be 
the number of bargaining rounds during the reorganization period. Let Vi 
denote the value of the company if the parties adopt a reorganization plan at 
the end of round i, where i = 1, ... ,n. 5 
The firm's value Vi evolves over time. That is, if the parties approve a 
reorganization plan in any round after round 1, the value divided might differ 
from V1. Specifically, if delay were to occur, the value may change for the 
following two reasons. One reason is that the firm will bear "financial distress 
costs" -efficiency costs that the firm must incur while it is in Chapter 11 and 
that it would not incur if it had a new capital structure. There are several 
sources of financial distress costs. First, Chapter 11 bankruptcy involves 
significant administrative costs; indeed, the fees paid to lawyers, accountants, 
various professional consultants, and expert witnesses in a Chapter 11 re-
organization of a publicly traded company are often on the order of tens of 
3. Our assumption that the firm cannot emerge from Chapter II before t = T without an 
agreement is a simplification of the legal rules. In reality, the equityholders can impose a plan on 
the debtholders so long as the debtholders are paid in full. The equityholders would choose to exit 
Chapter II by paying D in full if during the bargaining the value of the firm were to rise 
sufficiently above D, for much the same reasons (to be discussed below in Section 2. 7) that they 
would rather avoid Chapter II if V were sufficiently greater than D. 
We adopt our simplifying assumption for convenience; a more complex model could include 
this option for the equityholders to exit Chapter II but would not yield results significantly 
different from ours. In particular, this extension of our model would not change the direction of 
our comparative statics results. The addition of such an "exit option" would only increase the 
share of the firm obtained by the equityholders. This option can only strengthen the equityholders' 
bargaining power, because they would exercise this option only if it would improve their payoffs. 
4. In particular, after the filing of a Chapter II case, acceptance for any particular plan may 
not be solicited until after a hearing by the supervising court held on 25-days notice to the parties 
in interest. 
5. Once the firm is reorganized and its shares are distributed, its new shareholders would 
obviously have the power to select the company's management. We do not analyze the possibility 
that either the equityholders or the debtholders have any special management skills necessary for 
running the company. Ignoring this possibility appears quite appropriate for publicly traded firms, 
which are often run by professional managers. Baird and Picker, who focus on the reorganization 
of closely held firms with a small group of shareholders-managers, consider the interesting 
implications of the presence of shareholders-managers with some special management skills. 
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millions of dollars. In one recent reorganization of a major corporation, the 
bankruptcy expenses of the company and of the creditor committees came to 
$3.5 million per month (see Cutler and Summers:167). Second, potential 
business partners may be reluctant to deal with the company or may demand 
especially favorable terms, for those doing business with a firm in financial 
distress may incur greater information costs, monitoring costs, enforcement 
costs, and collection costs. Third, financial distress might lead to inefficient 
management decisions, especially with respect to the choice of projects and 
investments (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling; Myers; Hart and Moore, 1990). 
For an empirical investigation of such financial distress costs, see Lang and 
Stulz. We assume that as a result of these financial distress costs, the company 
loses an amount of its value continuously over time at the rate of a per period 
L1t-that is, per round of bargaining-as long as the company is in Chapter 
11.6 
The second reason for Vi to change over time is that uncertainty will be 
realized. Random shocks may increase or decrease the value of the company's 
assets. We assume that during each round of bargaining, unpredictable events 
would cause this value to be either higher or lower than expected by the 
amount 8, and that either state of the world occurs with equal probability. The 
parameter 8, then, represents the volatility of the firm's value. For con-
creteness, we assume that at the beginning of each round, information is 
revealed that causes the value of the firm to either rise or fall instantaneously 
by the amount (). 
Let the value realized after revelation of information at the start of round 1 
be V and let Vi be the value at the end of round i. Thus, V1 = V- a, and Vi = 
Vi-I + Oi, fori= 2, ... ,n, Where Oi = -a-() With probability!, and Oi = 
-a + 8 with probability!. The value of oi is realized at the start of round i, 
before the ith offer is made. We assume 0 < a < 8, so that the company's 
value will increase with probability ! despite the financial distress costs. We 
also assume that (n - 1)(a + 8) < V1, so that the company's value cannot 
disappear completely during the reorganization period. 7 
6. Note that the financial distress costs in our model result from the firm's mere presence in 
Chapter 11 and would be eliminated only if a reorganization agreement were reached (creating a 
sound financial structure). We abstract from the possibility that the shareholders might be able to 
cause some deterioration beyond the one resulting from the firm's being in Chapter 11 and, 
seeking to get concessions from the debtholders, might threaten to do so. Bergman and Callen 
present an interesting model of threats by shareholders of solvent firms to deliberately cause some 
deterioration in the situation of the firm. As they discuss, a critical question with respect to such 
threats is that of credibility. The credibility issue does not arise with respect to the financial 
distress costs in our model, because these costs would be incurred, whether or not the share-
holders wish to have them, as long as the firm is in Chapter 11. 
7. For simplicity, we can assume that the interest rate is zero, so that there is no discounting. 
Alternatively, we can allow for a positive interest rate and interpret all variables representing 
values-such as V, V1o and D-as present discounted values. Under this interpretation, we 
would assume that all equityholders and debtholders share a common discount rate, which would 
also equal the interest rate on the debt. V would denote the present discounted value of the future 
stream of earnings that the assets would produce if the firm were reorganized at time t = 0. 
Similarly, V; would be the corresponding value (discounted to time t = 0) if the firm were 
reorganized at the end of round i. 
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We also assume the following timing of events. In each round, once the 
uncertainty is realized, one party proposes a reorganization plan, that is, a 
division of the value that will exist at the end of the round. At the end of the 
round, after the delay created by the rules governing the solicitation of accep-
tances, the value has deteriorated by the amount a. At this point, the two 
classes decide whether to accept or reject the plan. The class proposing the 
plan, naturally, votes to accept the proposal. If the other class also accepts the 
proposal, the plan is confirmed, and the firm immediately emerges from 
Chapter 11 with its· value divided according to the plan. If the other class 
instead rejects the proposal, then the parties go to the next round of 
bargaining. 8 
As in any sequential bargaining model, it is necessary to specify a pro-
cedure that determines which party makes the offer in each round. In the case 
of Chapter 11 bargaining, the Bankruptcy Code determines some of this 
bargaining protocol. The Bankruptcy Code establishes a period during which 
only the debtor (i.e., the incumbent management) has the right to propose 
reorganization plans. The incumbent management generally will have at least 
six months in which to produce a reorganization plan and obtain the necessary 
acceptances, and courts may grant extensions of this period (see Trost: 1325). 
Although the insolvent corporation and its management have fiduciary duties 
to creditors as well as shareholders, most observers expect management to 
favor the interests of shareholders. As Normandin (1989:56-8) notes, man-
agement not only is elected by the shareholders but also often holds a substan-
tial interest in the corporation's stock. Consistent with this observation, this 
article assumes that with respect to proposals to divide the value of the 
reorganized firm between equityholders and debtholders, management acts on 
behalf of the equityholders. 9 
To represent the period during which the management has the exclusive 
8. The above description of the sequence of events assumes implicitly that each class of 
claimants acts as a single agent. We assume that the set of equityholders and the set of debtholders 
are mutually exclusive. Given our assumptions, there is no conflict of interest among the class 
members, and they will all agree on whether a plan should be accepted or rejected. 
Given the homogeneity of each class in the model, there is no need to introduce the possibility 
that exists under section 1129 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Code for a veto by an individual member. 
Under that provision, dissenting members can veto a plan that fails the "best interests of the 
creditors" test-that is, a plan that provides them with less than the liquidation value of their 
claims-even if the required majority of the class votes to accept the plan. When there are 
differences in preferences or in information among class members, then individual members may 
wish sometimes to exercise such a veto. But if there are no such differences among class 
members, as we assume, then no member would wish to veto a plan that other members of the 
class voted to approve. 
9. It is not our assumption that management acts in the equityholders' interests in all respects. 
The interests of the equityholders and of management may well diverge with respect to certain 
investment decisions. With respect to management's proposals to divide the value of the re-
organized firm between equityholders and debtholders, however, we believe it reasonable to 
assume that management will prefer the interests of equityholders. 
The assumptions that the managers initially have exclusive control of the bargaining agenda, 
and that they use this control to the advantage of the equityholders, do not matter much for our 
results. As will be noted, one can easily modify our model to accommodate the case in which 
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right to propose plans, we assume that the equityholders make at least the first 
offer and possibly the first several offers. That is, they have the exclusive right 
to make offers for the first e rounds, where e is an integer such that 0 < e < n. 
Over the remaining n - e rounds, both classes may make offers. (This 
possibility is indeed contemplated by Chapter 11 , and firms often remain in 
Chapter 11 even after the exclusive period runs out.) To capture the possibility 
of either party making the offer in any given round, we assume that at the 
beginning of each of these n - e rounds, the identity of the class making the 
offer is determined randomly, with the probability of each equal to !. 10 
If the parties were to fail to reach agreement in round n, we assume that the 
court would convert the proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In that event, 
the assets of the company would be sold. Let the random variable L denote the 
value obtained through such a sale, which would then be divided according to 
the legal priority of the parties' claims. That is, equityholders get an amount 
VEL= max(O, L- D), and debtholders get the complementary share, VDL = 
L - max(O, L - D) = min(L, D). At this point, we will assume that L = Vn; 
that is, we assume that the sale procedure occurs immediately and does not 
involve any loss of value. In Section 2.5, however, we will drop the assump-
tion that L = Vn and extend the analysis to cover the case in which L < Vn. 
We also assume that all parties are risk neutral. Thus, each class seeks to 
maximize the expected value of its share. Finally, we assume that the structure 
of the bargaining game described above-including the values of the param-
eters V 1 , D, L, a, 8, T, e, and n-is common knowledge to the participants. 
2.2 The Division of Value 
Under the assumption of common knowledge, the parties will reach an agree-
ment at the end of round 1. As in the sequential bargaining game analyzed by 
Rubinstein, to obtain agreement, the party making the proposal in round i 
would offer the other at least what the other could obtain in expected value in 
round i + 1, where i = 1, ... ,n - 1. Each party would offer just this amount to 
the other in order to maximize its own share. It cannot expect to do better by 
asking for any larger amount, which would delay agreement and allow the 
other party to make the next offer. 
The party whose tum it would be in round i, denoted by X, offers to take the 
amount VX; of the total value V;. By the argument above, 
(1) 
there is no initial agenda control or the case in which the control is not exercised in the interest of 
equityholders, and these modifications do not have important effects on our conclusions. See 
Section 2.8 and note 14, respectively. 
10. Having each party make the offer with probability ! in each round is one of the two 
conventional alternatives in modeling a situation in which two parties can make offers. The 
second alternative is to assume that the two parties alternate in making offers. In a model with a 
finite number of rounds (such as ours), however, the first alternative ensures that the division of 
value is not sensitive to whether the number of rounds, n, is even or odd. We prefer the first 
method because it renders it unnecessary to make such arbitrary assumptions regarding n. 
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where VXi + 1 denotes the amount X would obtain under the plan proposed in 
the next round, and Ei denotes the expected value conditional on information 
available in round i, that is, conditional on the realized value of Vi. By our 
assumptions about 0, we also know that the expected "efficiency gain" from 
an agreement in round i rather than round i + 1 is 
(2) 
Using (2) to substitute into (1), 
(3) 
Thus, when the party making the offer, X, holds the other to its expected 
payoff next round, X thereby takes for itself the expected "efficiency gain," a, 
plus its own expected payoff next round. 
Under liquidation at the end of round n, equityholders would receive VEv 
and debtholders would receive VDv where VEL + VDL = L = Vn. In round 
n, the party making the offer cannot gain by proposing any other division, 
because the other party will reject any proposal offering it a smaller share. 
Therefore, VEn = VEL and VDn = VDL. The party making the nth offer 
cannot capture any "efficiency gain" from avoiding financial distress costs, 
because we have assumed here that liquidation occurs costlessly and immedi-
ately upon rejection of the offer. 
We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induc-
tion. In round n - 1, the party making the offer would hold the other to its 
expected round n payoff and take for itself the expected "efficiency gain" 
(from agreement in round n- 1 rather than round n), a, plus its own expected 
round n payoff. Similarly, in round n - 2, the offering party would hold the 
other party to its expected round n - 1 payoff (which is !a plus its expected 
round n payoff, if it would make the offer in round n - 1 with probability!) 
and take the balance. That balance amounts to the expected "efficiency gain" 
(from agreement in round n - 2 rather than round n - 1), a, plus its own 
expected round n- 1 payoff. Its expected round n - 1 payoff, in tum, is also 
!a plus its expected round n payoff, if it would make the offer in round n - 1 
with probability ! . 11 
In sum, in each round, each party receives its expected round n payoff plus 
a times the number of offers it would expect to make from the current round to 
round n - 1. In round 1, therefore, the equityholders receive their expected 
round n payoff plus a times the number of offers they would expect to make 
before round n. Because each party would expect to make !(n - 1 - e) offers 
11 . All expectations are taken conditional on information available at the time of the current 
offer, that is, in round n - 2. Recall that by the law of iterated expectations, the expectation of an 
expectation conditional on more information is simply the unconditional expectation. In the 
example above, 
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from round e + 1 to round n - 1 , and the equityholders in addition would 
make all e offers from round 1 to round e, the equityholders receive 
(4) 
and the debtholders receive 
(5) 
at the end of round 1. Moreover, because we assume liquidation is costless, 
(4) equals 
VE 1 = !a(e + n - 1) + E 1[max(O,Vn -D)], (6) 
and (5) equals 
VD 1 = !a(n - 1 - e) + E 1[min(D, Vn)]. (7) 
The second term in ( 6) is the expected value of what equityholders would 
receive if there is no agreement through round n and there is instead liquida-
tion. In the alternative, we may express this expected value as 
(8) 
where Pr(Vn > D) is the probability of Vn > D. We can also express this 
expected value as a function of our basic parameters, making use of the 
particular probability distribution of v n· 
Lemma 1. The expected values of what the parties would receive from a 
costless liquidation if they failed to reach agreement by time t = T are as 
follows: 
n-1 
k~=O ( _21 ) n-1 (n -k 1 ) Edmax(O,Vn -D)] = L.J 
x max[O,V1 - D - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k] (9) 
for the equityholders, and 
. ~
1 
( 1 ) n-1 ( n - 1 ) 
E 1[mm(D, Vn)] = L.J 2 k 
k=O 
X min[D, V1 - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k] (10) 
for the debtholders. 
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Proof Each round is a Bernoulli trial in which o may take on one of two 
values with equal probability, so n - 1 such trials from round 2 to round n 
lead to 2n- 1 equally likely sequences of o i· Let k represent the number of 
times o takes on the high value, 8 - a, from the end of round 1 to the end of 
round n, so that n - 1 - k is the number of times it takes on the low value, 
-8 - a. The number of distinct sequences with the same k is given by the 
binomial coefficient. Thus, k is a random variable, taking values from 0 ton 
- 1, that follows the binomial distribution: 
( 
1 ) n-1 ( n - 1 ) ( 1 ) n-1 
b(k,n - 1) = 2 k 2 (n - 1)! (11) k!(n - 1 - k)! 
Given any set of values for the parameters known in round 1, including V1, 
there are n possible values for V n• because there are n possible values for k: 
VJk) = V1 - a(n - 1) + 8k - 8(n - 1 - k) 
= V1 - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k. (12) 
Therefore, the probability of each Vn(k) is given by the binomial formula in 
(11). Together (11) and (12) yield the above lemma. • 
Using (9) and (10) to substitute into (6) and (7), respectively, we can 
conclude with the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. The two classes of claimants will adopt a reorganization 
plan in round 1, with the equityholders obtaining 
1 n~l ( 1 )n-1 ( n - 1 ) 
VE 1 = 2 a(e + n - 1) + LJ 2 k k=O 
x max[O,V 1 - D - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k], (13) 
and the debtholders obtaining the complementary share: 
VD
1 
= .!.a(n - 1 - e) + ~
1 
( .!. )n-I ( n - 1 ) 
2 k=O 2 k 
X min[D, V 1 - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k], (14) 
2.3 The Sources of the Equityholders' Power 
Although debtholders' claims exceed the value of the firm in round 1, equity-
holders receive a round-1 share greater than 0. We can isolate two distinct 
sources of the equityholders' power to obtain more than its contractual right. 
The equityholders' share, VE 1 as expressed in (13), is composed of two terms. 
Each term corresponds to a different reason for equityholders to get a positive 
share even though D > V1• (In Section 2.5, when we introduce the possibility 
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that conversion to Chapter 7 liquidation may cause the firm to lose value, 
there will be a third source of the equityholders' power to obtain value.) 
2.3.1 The Financial Distress Costs Created by Delay. The total "efficiency I 
gains" from reaching agreement in round 1 rather than leaving the firm in 
Chapter 11 for n rounds is a(n - 1 ), because such agreement thereby avoids 
the deterioration in firm value that would occur during the next n - 1 rounds. 
Because the consent of the equityholders is necessary to avoid incurring these 
financial distress costs, the equityholders can obtain part of these savings in 
exchange for that consent. The first term in (13) is the equityholders' share of 
these savings and represents the gain to equityholders from the presence of 
financial distress costs. If we let a go to 0 in the limit, then the savings from 
avoiding delay also go to 0, and the equityholders would receive only the 
second term, E 1[VEn]. 
The first term in (13), !a(e + n - 1), may be expressed as the sum of two 
elements, as in (4). First, during the first e rounds, when the equityholders 
have the exclusive power to make offers, they expect to capture all the savings 
from agreement in round 1 rather than in round e + 1 . This surplus amounts to 
ae. Second, during the last n- e rounds, when both the equityholders and the 
debtholders can make offers, each class expects to capture half of the savings 
from agreement in round e + 1 rather than in round n. Therefore, the equity-
holders can obtain half of this surplus, that is, !a(n - 1 - e), in round 1. 
2.3.2 The "Option Value" Created by Delay. The second term in (13) repre-
sents the gain to equityholders from the possibility of V n greater than D. The 
equityholders could deny their consent to any plan and delay a division of 
value until round n. Given the volatility of Vi, there is some chance that at the 
end of round n, Vn will exceed D. Although the expected value of Vn is less 
than V1 , the actual value of Vn might exceed V1 and even D. The Chapter 11 
process, by giving the equityholders the ability to insist on delay, gives 
equityholders the option to receive the difference Vn - D. To give up this 
option, equityholders must get compensation in return. 
Specifically, equityholders receive the expected value of VEn, that is, the 
full value of the equityholders' "option." This "option value" is positive if 
and only if Pr(Vn >D) > 0. Furthermore, Pr(Vn >D) > 0 if and only if Vn > 
D when all uncertainty is resolved favorably, that is, 6 = (} - a in each round, 
so that k = n - 1 in (12). Therefore, the following two conditions are 
equivalent: 
Pr(Vn > D) > 0 ~ (n - 1)((} - a) > D - V1. (15) 
2.4 Comparative Statics 
The equityholders' share of V1 consists of two terms that depend on the 
following parameters: (i) the initial undercoverage of debt, D - V 1 ; (ii) the 
volatility of the firm's value from period to period, (}; (iii) the financial 
distress costs per unit of time Lit, a; (iv) the length of the reorganization 
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period measured in rounds of bargaining, n; and (v) the length of the period 
during which the equityholders control the agenda, also measured in rounds of 
bargaining, e. We will now examine how each of these parameters affects the 
equityholders' share, VE 1 • 
2.4.1 The Initial Undercoverage of Debt. By the initial undercoverage of 
debt, we mean the extent to which the debt exceeds the value of the firm's 
assets at the end of round 1 , D - V 1 • 
Proposition 2. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is non-
increasing in D - V 1 (and thus in D). Furthermore, if there is a positive 
probability that V n will exceed D, then VE 1 is decreasing in D - V 1 (and thus 
in D).I 2 
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is as follows. A rise in D -
V 1 affects only the second term in (13). In particular, it shifts down the entire 
probability distribution of Vn - D in the expression for the equityholders' 
"option value" in (13). That "option value" arises from the possibility of V; 
rising from V1 to above D due to positive shocks. Because a higher D - V1 
makes this event less likely, it reduces this "option value." Thus, as shown in 
the proof, a rise in D - V 1 cannot make equityholders better off, and if D -
V 1 is small enough to imply Pr(Vn >D)> 0, then such a rise must cause their 
"option value" (and their share of V1) to decrease. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
2.4.2 The Volatility of Firm Value. The volatility of the firm's value over time, 
represented bye, depends upon the nature of the firm's business and thus may 
vary greatly from firm to firm. 
Proposition 3. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is non-
decreasing in 8. Furthermore, if there is a positive probability that Vn will 
exceed or equal D, then VE 1 is increasing in (). 
13 
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is as follows. The volatility 
of the firm's value affects only the second term in (13). As shown in the proof, 
the greater that volatility, (), the greater the likelihood that Vn will exceed D, 
and the greater will be the equityholders' "option value." Thus, a rise in () 
must leave equityholders at least as well off as before, and if() is large enough 
12. Specifically, if D - V1 < (n- 1)(0 - a), then Pr(Vn >D)> 0, and increasing D - V1 
will cause V£1 to decrease. If D - V1 ::::: (n - 1)(0 - a), then Pr(Vn >D) = 0, and further 
increasing D - V 1 will have no effect on VE 1• 
13. Specifically, if 0 < a + (D - V1)/(n - 1), then Pr(Vn :::::D) = 0, and increasing 0 will 
have no effect on V£1. If 0::::: a+ (D- V1)/(n- 1), then Pr(Vn::::: D)> 0, and increasing 0 will 
cause VE 1 to increase. 
266 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, VB N2 
to imply Pr(Vn 2: D) > 0, then their "option value" (and their share of V1) 
must increase in 8. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
2.4.3 The Financial Distress Costs. The financial distress costs per unit of 
time that the firm remains in Chapter 11, a, are likely to vary greatly among 
firms. For example, a company that owns a number of buildings leased under 
long-term leases would incur small financial distress costs (because few trans-
actions would have to take place during the Chapter 11 period) relative to a 
company that deals frequently with many business partners and makes fre-
quent investment decisions. 
Proposition 4. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1, is increas-
ing in a. 
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is as follows. The size of 
the financial distress costs, a, will affect both terms in (13). Thus, a rise in a 
has two effects. On the one hand, it increases the financial distress costs that 
can be saved if the equityholders consent to a plan, thus improving their 
bargaining position. On the other hand, it decreases their "option value" 
because it makes it less likely that Vi can climb beyond D. If a increases to the 
point that Pr(Vn >D) = 0, then the equityholders' share is affected by a only 
through the first effect and therefore a rise in a makes equityholders unam-
biguously better off. Furthermore, as shown in the proof, the positive effect is 
always greater than the negative effect, because the financial distress costs are 
more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders. Therefore, 
the equityholders' share increases in a. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
2.4.4 The Length of the Reorganization Period. The length of the reorganiza-
tion period, represented in our model by T (or equivalently by the number of 
rounds n), depends on how long the bankruptcy court will wait, in the face of 
failure to work out a reorganization plan, before converting from Chapter 11 
to Chapter 7. Let us consider increases in T by multiples of L1 t, which would 
cause n to rise by an integer, so as to maintain the structure of the model, 
which assumes that n is an integer. 
Proposition 5. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1, is increas-
ing in n. 
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 5 is as follows. A rise in T 
affects both terms in (13) through n. First, it raises the total financial distress 
costs that the firm would incur if equityholders never gave their consent to a 
plan. This effect strengthens their bargaining power. Second, once Pr(Vn >D) 
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> 0, an increase inn also would have an effect on their "option value." As 
shown in the proof, some increases will cause an upward change in the 
"option value" (because high values for vn become more likely) whereas 
others will cause a downward change (because the expected value of Vn falls). 
We show in the proof, however, that even in the case of a downward change, 
the overall effect on the equityholders' share is positive. In those cases in 
which a rise inn causes the equityholders' "option value" to fall, the positive 
effect upon the equityholders' share of the "efficiency gains" would be greater 
than the absolute value of the negative effect, because the costs of delay 
would be more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
2.4.5 The Initial Agenda Control. As already noted, the equityholders have 
control over the agenda for the first six months of bargaining, and the courts 
often extend this period. Our model captures this feature of Chapter 11 by 
assuming that all offers in the first e rounds, 0 < e < n, must be made by the 
equityholders. 14 The size of e depends on the courts' willingness to extend the 
initial six-month period. 
Proposition 6. The share of V1 obtained by the equityholders, VE 1, is in-
creasing in e. Specifically, any unit increase in e causes VE 1 to increase by la. 
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 6 is as follows. Control over 
the reorganization agenda is valuable. During each round in which the equity-
holders have this control, they would capture all of the financial distress costs, 
a. In any round in which both sides can make offers, however, the equity-
holders expect to capture only la. The incremental gain to the equityholders 
from any unit increase in e is therefore la. The greater are the financial 
distress costs, the greater is the value of this unit increase (the derivative of 
the equityholders' gain with respect to a is i). Furthermore, a higher e implies 
that a rise in a benefits equityholders even more than it would otherwise, 
because only they gain bargaining power from the deterioration of firm value 
from round 1 to round e + 1. The derivative of the "efficiency gains" 
component in (13) with respect to a is i(e + n - 1), and each unit increase in 
e raises this derivative by l. 
Proof. The proof is clear from the above remark. 
14. In reality, the incumbent management controls the agenda during this initial period, but we 
have assumed that managers act on behalf of the equityholders. One could easily adjust the model 
to suit alternative assumptions. For example, consider a case in which the debt is held by a bank 
which the managers expect to hold most of the stock of the company after reorganization. In this 
case, one might assume that the management, in making offers during the period in which it 
controls the agenda, would serve the interests of the debtholders. As a result, the debtholders 
rather than the equityholders would capture all the surplus ae that is created by avoiding the 
financial distress costs that would be incurred during the initial period. 
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2.5 Loss from Chapter 7 Liquidation 
Until now we have assumed that a sale of the finn's assets under Chapter 7 
would not impose any efficiency loss. That is, we assumed that after n rounds 
a Chapter 7 sale would produce a value of L = Vn. This assumption would be 
reasonable if one adopted the view of Baird (1986) and Jackson (1986: 
chap. 9). According to that view, there is no reason to expect that a sale under 
Chapter 7, properly administered, would produce a value significantly below 
the finn's going-concern value. If the finn has greater value as a going 
concern, then the assets would be sold as a going concern. 
This view of Chapter 7, however, is by no means universally accepted. 
Many scholars and players in corporate insolvency believe, correctly or incor-
rectly, that Chapter 7 would involve some efficiency loss-that is, it might not 
bring in the full value Vn. For this reason, we now introduce the possibility 
that a Chapter 7 sale at t = T would produce a value L < Vn. 15 Specifically, let 
L = vn- A, where 0:::; A< VI - (n- 1)(8 + a), so that 0 < L:::; vn in all 
states of the world, that is, for any k. All other assumptions are as before. 
Using the same methods as those in Section 2.2, we find that the loss in value 
from liquidation introduces a third source of the equityholders' bargaining 
power. 
Proposition 7. If the two classes of claimants expect a Chapter 7 sale to 
involve a loss of value A, then they will adopt a reorganization plan in round 
1, with the equityholders obtaining 
1 1 n~l ( 1 ) n-1 ( n - 1 ) 
VE 1 = 2 a( e + n - 1) + 2 A + L..J 2 k k=O 
X max[O,V 1 - D -A - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k]. (16) 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Let us now examine the change that is introduced by the loss A from 
Chapter 7. As the following proposition indicates, the equityholders' share of 
V 1 tends to be larger as this loss is larger. 
Proposition 8. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is non-
decreasing in A. Thus, the equityholders are at least as well off when A > 0 as 
they are when A = 0. Furthermore, if the probability that L will exceed D is 
less than i, as is likely, then VE 1 is increasing in A. 16 
15. Furthermore, to the extent that liquidation does not occur immediately upon rejection of 
the last offer in round n, the firm would incur some financial distress costs between the end of 
round n and liquidation. In the alternative, then the possibility of L < Vn could represent the 
deterioration in the firm's value between the end of round n and liquidation. 
16. In particular, if (D - V1) + a(n- 1) +A.:::: fJ, as is likely, then Pr(L >D)<!, and V£1 is 
increasing in A.. 
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Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 8 is as follows. The expecta-
tion of the liquidation loss A would strengthen the equityholders' bargaining 
power and thereby increase their share, V£1 . Without their consent to a 
reorganization plan, the firm would not only suffer financial distress costs for 
n rounds, but would also suffer the losses from a Chapter 7 sale for less than 
the firm's full value. Thus, the equityholders' consent can save the firm the 
liquidation loss, A, and therefore they can expect to capture some part of these 
savings in exchange for their consent. At the same time, in our model, such a 
liquidation loss would reduce the equityholders' "option value," E 1 [VEL]. As 
shown in the proof, however, the positive effect is at least as great as the 
negative effect on this "option value." Furthermore, under conditions that 
ensure Pr(L >D) < -l, which is likely to hold for plausible parameter values, 
the positive effect must strictly dominate the negative effect, because then the 
loss would be more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders. 
Proof See the Appendix. 
2.6 Renegotiation Prior to Chapter 11 Filing 
Our model has assumed that the bargaining garpe begins upon the firm's filing 
under Chapter 11. One might consider, however, whether the parties would 
renegotiate their claims prior to filing under Chapter 11 (see, e.g., Berkovitch 
and Israel, Bergman and Callen, and Giammarino). To the extent that some 
financial distress costs are incurred prior to the filing, as is likely as the 
company approaches insolvency, the parties would have much to gain from 
such an earlier renegotiation. By this reasoning, if the parties know that once 
there is filing for Chapter 11 the firm's value will be divided in a certain way, 
then there will be no such filing because they will agree to such a division 
beforehand. Brown, for example, assumes in his model that such renegotia-
tion will always take place. 
Various factors, however, suggest that such renegotiation may not succeed 
outside of Chapter 11, because there may be a "free rider" or "holdout" 
problem (see Gertner and Scharfstein; Gilson, John, and Lang). Conse-
quently, renegotiation would instead take place, as in our model, only after the 
filing, and in accordance with the rules governing Chapter 11 reorganization. 
Outside of Chapter 11, each debtholders' claim cannot be waived unless the 
debtholder individually consents. Thus, each debtholder may hold out, prefer-
ring that other debtholders make the necessary concessions. In contrast, under 
Chapter 11 a provision for majority rule solves this collective-action problem: 
the specified majority in any given class can vote to make concessions on 
behalf of each of the members of the class, without the unanimous consent of 
its members, and can thereby impose the plan on its members who dissent. 17 
17. Similarly, contractual mechanisms could solve this collective-action problem outside of 
Chapter 11. The Trust Indenture Act, however, prohibits contractual provisions that would enable 
the majority of bondholders to concede any part of the principal on the bonds. As Roe notes, the 
unanimous approval requirements of that law may generate holdout problems within a class and 
thereby inhibit a troubled firm's ability to avert bankruptcy proceedings. 
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Thus, although the parties may renegotiate their claims before filing for 
Chapter 11 to avoid excessive delay within Chapter 11, they will face the 
problem of holdouts. To solve this problem, the company may file for Chapter 
11 so that a majority vote on the proposed plan would bind all members within 
each class. Through this mechanism, the negotiating parties can settle on a 
reorganization plan before the filing, then have the prepackaged plan con-
firmed within Chapter 11. See Broude (1990:§ 11.06). Nevertheless, as the 
parties formulate the prepackaged plan, they would anticipate the outcome of 
Chapter 11 bargaining. Thus, under such prepackaged plans, the equity-
holders would not receive less than they would expect from Chapter 11 
bargaining. 
2.7 Chapter 11 Filing by "Solvent" Companies 
Thus far we have assumed that upon filing for reorganization, the value of the 
firm's assets is less than its debt: V <D. A company, however, need not be 
insolvent to file under Chapter 11, and observers generally believe that some 
firms file with V 2::: D. We now sketch briefly what our model suggests with 
respect to the outcome of such a filing (and the ex ante incentive on the part of 
equityholders to have such a filing). 
Suppose that a firm files for Chapter 11 with V 2::: D, but with V still small 
enough to cause financial distress costs. Our model can be easily extended to 
analyze the bargaining game following such a filing. As before, the parties 
would understand that delay in adopting a reorganization plan would have two 
consequences: the firm would incur financial distress costs, and uncertainty 
would be resolved. Therefore, the outcome of the game would still be the 
partition described in Proposition 1. The interesting question, however, is 
whether this expected outcome of the bargaining game would lead equity-
holders to favor a filing for Chapter 11. 
The partition predicted by Proposition 1 for V 2::: D suggests two pos-
sibilities. If Vis sufficiently close to D, the equityholders can still get more 
than their contractual right, V - D. Uncertainty would work in favor of the 
equityholders through the "option value" element. Moreover, if V is suffi-
ciently close to D (or if the financial distress costs a are large enough), then 
the erosion in value that would result from a delay in reorganization for a 
period T would come mostly at the expense of the debtholders. Consequently, 
the debtholders would make concessions-agree to be paid less than their 
contractual right -and the equityholders would thus obtain more than their 
contractual right. Given this expected outcome, it would be in the equity-
holders' interest in such a case for the company's management to file for 
Chapter 11. 
If V is not sufficiently close to D, however, and the company files for 
Chapter 11 , then the outcome of the bargaining game would be unfavorable 
for the equityholders. For in such a case, the prospect of financial distress 
costs would work against the equityholders in the bargaining, because the 
equityholders would be expected to bear most of these costs. Consequently, 
the outcome predicted by Proposition 1 might be one in which the debtholders 
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obtain more (and the equityholders less) than their contractual right. Such 
Chapter 11 cases, however, might not actually arise. In such cases, the in-
terest of equityholders would not be served by the company filing for Chapter 
11-they would prefer to have the company pay the debt in full, raising the 
necessary funds by selling assets or issuing extra equity. Thus, to the extent 
that management seeks to advance the interests of the equityholders, one 
would not expect the company to file for Chapter 11 in such cases.l 8 
2.8 Informal Offers and Agenda Control 
One feature of Chapter 11 that we sought to represent in our model is the fact 
that during a certain period only the company could propose reorganization 
plans. We assumed that the equityholders would make all offers during this 
period, because we assumed that the company's management acts in the 
interests of the equityholders. We assumed that thereafter either one class or 
the other would have control of the bargaining agenda during each bargaining 
round, and that the procedural rules governing formal proposals determined 
the duration of these rounds. 
One might argue, however, that the model should not feature such ex-
clusive agenda control, in light of the possibility of informal offers. For 
example, although the debtholders cannot formally propose plans in the initial 
period during which the company has an exclusive right to do so, they can tell 
the company informally what plans they would be willing to accept. There-
fore, in spite of the exclusive control of the formal agenda under Chapter 11, 
one might model the bargaining as a symmetric game in which both sides may 
make offers. According to this view, the legal monopoly over the formal 
agenda is practically meaningless. 
Such a change in assumptions would require only minor modifications in 
our model, because exclusive agenda control is not a critical element of the 
model. If both classes may make offers throughout the bargaining period, then 
each would simply obtain half of the savings created by avoiding the financial 
distress costs during this period. Nevertheless, because the provision for 
exclusive agenda control during the initial period often arises in policy discus-
sions, we should explain why in our view, in spite of the possibility of 
informal offers, control over the formal agenda is important in practice and 
may give a significant bargaining advantage to the party with this control. 
When one class proposes a formal plan under Chapter 11 , the other class 
must decide whether to accept, after the delay required by law. Each knows 
that rejection would result in the extra delay required for another proposal and 
another vote. The class that proposes the plan can capture almost all the 
surplus created by avoiding the delay, because the other class would rather 
accept any small share of the surplus than reject the plan and lose the surplus. 
Of course, informal offers may precede a formal proposal, but unlike a 
formal plan, an informal offer cannot be accepted by a binding class vote. The 
18. Managers may file for Chapter 11 in such a case, however, for some self-serving reasons. 
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"acceptance" of an informal offer thus lacks the legal implications of the ac-
ceptance of a formal offer: an informal acceptance cannot partition the com-
pany's value nor bring the company out of Chapter 11. An informal proposal 
is merely a suggestion for the other side to make a particular formal proposal. 
Regardless of such suggestions, the party making the formal proposal can be 
expected to propose the plan most favorable to the proposing party among 
those that the other party would rationally accept. 19 Informal proposals cannot 
affect this plan if (as is the case in our setting) there is no mechanism by which 
the party making an informal proposal can make a credible commitment to 
reject any less favorable proposal. 20 Moreover, as long as the debtholders 
have no private information (as is the case in our setting), an informal offer by 
them cannot convey any information. 
In sum, the possibility of informal offers does not render control over the 
formal agenda meaningless. This formal control may well give an important 
bargaining advantage to the party exercising this control. 21 Therefore, we 
have sought to capture this effect in our model. 
2.9 Delay in Reaching Agreement on a Plan 
In the model, because it was assumed that there was no asymmetric informa-
tion, the resolution of the bargaining occurred in round 1. Suppose one were 
to introduce asymmetric information about the firm's value V. For example, 
suppose that the equityholders (or more precisely, the management of the 
debtor who might be acting in their interests) have some private information 
not held by the debtholders. In this case, the sequential bargaining litera-
ture suggests that reaching an agreement may well take some time (as indeed 
often happens in reality22) and that the parties will incur significant efficiency 
costs. See, for example, Grossman and Perry, Fudenberg and Tirole, and 
Crampton. 23 
19. Consider a company in which the value of the assets is $100. Suppose that in one month 
the court will convert the Chapter 11 proceeding to Chapter 7, and that $30 would be lost in 
liquidation, leaving only $70 for the debtholders. Suppose also that one month must pass between 
the formal proposal by the equityholders and a vote on that proposal. The equityholders would 
propose a plan that would give them almost $30 and leave slightly more than $70 for the 
debtholders. Even if the debtholders had suggested informally a plan that would give them more, 
say $75, the equityholders would have no reason to modify their plan, because they know that at 
the end of the month the debtholders would rationally vote to accept any amount greater than $70. 
20. Informal offers would serve a purpose, however, if the debtholders can commit not to give 
up more than a certain fraction of the surplus. For example, a bank may be a repeat player in 
Chapter 11 reorganizations and may have a reputation that enables it to make such a credible 
commitment. In such a case, the bank can insist on a particular fraction of the surplus and 
communicate informally its position. To succeed, however, the bank must have not only the 
ability to make informal offers but also the ability to make such a commitment. 
21. Even prepackaged plans formulated before filing for Chapter 11 would reflect the bargain-
ing advantage that the equityholders would enjoy through their exclusive control over the agenda 
during the initial period under Chapter 11. See Section 2.6. 
22. White (1984:35, 37) found the average length of the reorganization period, from bank-
ruptcy filing to confirmation of a plan, to be 17 months. See also Franks and Torous (1989:753). 
23. Since writing this article, we learned of the work of Kaiser in the direction outlined above. 
He introduces asymmetric information in a bargaining model of reorganization and confirms that 
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The structure imposed upon the bargaining by Chapter 11 is crucial to this 
result. Gul and Sonnenschein point out that asymmetric information between 
bargaining parties cannot by itself explain delay in reaching agreement, be-
cause as the length of each round is allowed to go to 0, so does the total delay. 
This objection does not apply to the reorganization context, however, because 
the legal rules governing Chapter 11 bargaining imply that, unlike the case in 
other contexts, there is a limit to how short the bargaining rounds can be. 
3. Concluding Remarks . 
In this article, we have sought to develop a sequential bargaining model of the 
Chapter 11 negotiation process, to show the effects of the legal rules that 
govern this process, and to determine the shares of the firm's value that 
equityholders and debtholders may expect to receive under a reorganization 
plan. The model has identified and analyzed three possible sources of the 
equityholders' power to obtain value under Chapter 11 even if the value of the 
firm's assets is less than its debt: if they were to delay or prevent agreement, 
(i) the firm would incur financial distress costs, (ii) the volatility of its assets' 
value may create some probability that the firm becomes solvent, and (iii) a 
Chapter 7 sale may entail a loss in value. 
Our analysis has identified how various features of the company shape the 
Chapter 11 division of value. Our results regarding the effects of the com-
pany's features provide testable implications of the model. In particular, one 
could test the hypotheses that equityholders tend to capture a larger fraction of 
the value of the reorganized company when (i) the value of the company's 
assets is volatile (as measured, say, by the past volatility of the company's 
total stock and bond value), (ii) the nature of the company's business is such 
that financial distress costs are likely to be relatively high, or (iii) the total 
value of the reorganized company is a relatively large fraction of the outstand-
ing debt. 24 
We have also analyzed how the various features of the legal regime contrib-
ute to the equityholders' ability to extract value, and our analysis reveals how 
changes in this regime would affect the equityholders' share. The length of the 
reorganization period-the time that the parties expect the court to allow them 
significant delay can result. Kaiser focuses on the possibility of delay and the factors that 
determine the length of this delay, not on the factors that determine the division of value between 
equityholders and debtholders. Thus, his article complements this article. 
24. Recent empirical studies of Chapter II have confirmed that equityholders obtain more than 
their contractual right, but have not tested any of these three hypotheses. Our preliminary analysis 
of the data presented in Table II of Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990:1463) offers some 
support for hypothesis (iii). A simple linear regression on their 30 observations reveals that the 
extent to which senior claims (those of creditors and of preferred shareholders) exceed total value 
(expressed as a percent of total value) has a statistically significant negative effect upon the 
percent of total value paid to common shareholders: we find the relevant coefficient to be 
-0.04727, with a standard error of 0.02428. If we restrict the sample to the 18 cases of insolvent 
companies, the regression again reveals a negative effect, but it is no longer statistically signifi-
cant: we find the coefficient to be -0.00729, with a standard error of 0.01267. A proper 
hypothesis test, however, would require data on all explanatory variables that the model indicates 
we should include in the regression. 
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to remain in Chapter 11, without adopting a plan, before converting to Chap-
ter 7-proves to be a critical feature. We find that any change in judicial 
attitudes that would shorten this period would decrease the equityholders' 
share. In addition, the equityholders benefit from their control over the agenda 
during the initial period; thus, any reduction in the length of this period would 
tend to shift the division of value in favor of the debtholders. 25 
The normative question remains: Is the ability of the equityholders to 
receive more than their contractual right in Chapter 11 undesirable? One 
perspective from which this question may be evaluated is distributional; that 
is, it may be asked whether creditors are treated unfairly. With respect to most 
voluntary creditors, the answer may well be no, because the terms of their 
contracts will likely take the possibility of Chapter 11 into account. In particu-
lar, lenders will likely anticipate the outcome of possible Chapter 11 proceed-
ings and charge a higher interest rate than they would in the absence of 
Chapter 11. But companies often have also involuntary creditors, such as tort 
victims, who cannot protect themselves contractually as voluntary creditors 
can. Chapter 11 does transfer wealth from involuntary creditors to equity-
holders. 
Another perspective from which the distributional consequences of Chapter 
11 may be evaluated is that of efficiency. The expectation that equityholders 
will be able to use Chapter 11 to obtain more than their contractual right may 
affect the investment and management decisions that managers and equity-
holders make ex ante, either in the financial distress period preceding the 
filing for Chapter 11 (see Gertner and Scharfstein) or even prior to the onset of 
financial distress (see Bebchuk, 1991). Consequently, the division of value in 
Chapter 11, on which the analysis of this article has focused, may well have 
significant ex ante efficiency effects. 
Appendix 
In this appendix we derive several propositions, including our comparative 
statics results. To analyze the effect of the parameters on VE 1 , it will prove 
useful to make some preliminary observations. Consider the general model in 
Section 2.5, in which A~ 0 and L :s Vn. (To apply the following reasoning to 
the model in Section 2.4, which addresses a special case of the more general 
model, let A = 0, L = Vn, and VEL = VEn-) 
First, we derive a lemma pertaining to the "option value" component of 
VE1• Note that VEL is a continuous function of L - D. In particular, as the 
parameters change, VEL will equal (and therefore increase and decrease one-
for-one with) L - D if L > D, will remain constant at 0 if L < D, and will 
25. Only a more radical reform of Chapter 11, however, can ensure that all participants receive 
their contractual rights. Under any regime in which the consent of the equityholders is necessary 
to avoid delay in the firm's reorganization, the equityholders will be able to extract some value 
above their contractual right. Thus, Bebchuk (1988) proposes a method of reorganization based 
not on bargaining but on the distribution of particular securities to the participants. This reform 
would produce a distribution of value fully consistent with all the participants' contractual rights. 
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increase one-for-one (but not decrease) with L - D if L =D. Therefore, we 
can state the following lemma. 
Lemma AI. For any parameter x that does not affect the probability distribu-
tion of the random variable k-that is, forD - V1 , e, and a-the following 
holds for increases in x:26 
aEdVEd = E [ aVEL J 
ax 1 ·ax Pr(L ~ D)max [ 0, a(L a~ D) IJ.~D ] 
+ Pr (L > D )E I [ a(L a~ D) I L > D J . 
(A1) 
Second, we will find it useful to place an upper limit on Pr(L >D). Given 
the symmetric probability distribution of k, if n is odd, then the median value 
fork is E 1[k] = !(n - 1). In that case, the median value for L is similarly 
EdL] = VI - a(n - 1) - A, which must be less than D. Therefore, if n is 
odd, then Pr(L > D) < !. 
If n is instead even, then there is no unique median value fork. In this case, 
Pr(L >D) <!if and only if L :=; D fork= !n. As one can see from (12), if k 
= !n, then Vn = V1 - a(n - 1) + e. Therefore, if (D - V1) + a(n - 1) + 
A~ e, then Pr(L >D)<!. Furthermore, Pr(L >D)>! would require that L 
> D fork = !(n - 2). As one can see from (12), however, if k = !(n - 2), 
then vn = VI - a(n - 1) - e, which must be less than D. Therefore, 
Pr(L > D) > ! is impossible. We summarize these results in the following 
lemma. 
Lemma A2. Pr(L > D) :=; !, and Pr(L > D) < ! if and only if either 
(D - VI) + a(n - 1) + A ~ e or n is odd. 
Using Lemmas A1 and A2, we can now provide proofs of the propositions 
stating our comparative statics results. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the derivative of Vn - D with respect to 
D - V1 is -1 in any state of the world, that is, for any k. Therefore, recalling 
that VEL = VEn and L = Vn, and using Lemma A1, 
aEI[VEd 
a(D- VI) 
- Pr(Vn >D). (A2) 
26. The notation for the partial derivative of VEL (or its expected value) in this lemma and in 
the proofs below will represent the limit of .JVEL/.Jx as we approach x from the right side, in 
order to describe the effects of an increase in x. To describe decreases in x, we would approach x 
from the left side and would replace "max" in (AI) with "min." These two limits are not equal 
[i.e., although VEL(x) is continuous, it is not differentiable] at values of x where Pr(L > D) 
changes, because this probability changes only in discrete amounts. 
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Thus, increases in D - V1 will decrease the equityholders' "option value" 
until D - V1 ~ (n- 1)(8- a). At that point, by (15), the probability of Vn > 
D (and the "option value") reaches 0, and by (A2), increases in D - V1 then 
will have no further effect. • 
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that the partial derivative of Vn in (12) 
with respect to e is 2k - (n - 1 ), which is greater or less than 0 as k is greater 
or less than !(n - 1). That is, Vn increases in 8 in those states of the world in 
which k is larger than E 1 [k] = !(n - 1), which by (12) are those states in 
which Vn is larger than E1[Vn] = V1 - a(n - 1). Because Vn can affect 
E 1[VEn] only in those states in which Vn exceeds or equals D, which in tum 
exceeds V1 - a(n - 1) (indeed, exceeds V1), 8 can affect E 1[VEn] only in 
those states in which Vn is increasing in 8. In the relevant states, therefore, 
2k - (n - 1) > 0, and a rise in 8 can only increase Vn - D in the expres-
sion for the equityholders' "option value" in (13). Recalling that VEL = VEn 
and L = V n• and using Lemma A 1, then 
(A3) 
Furthermore, by reasoning analogous to that used to derive (15), the following 
two conditions are equivalent: 
Pr(Vn ~ D) > 0 ~ (n - 1)(8 - a) ~ D - V1 • (A4) 
A rise in 8, by (A3) and (A4), will have no effect on the expected value of VEn 
until 8 ~ a + (D - V1)/(n - 1); further increases will raise equityholders' 
"option value." • 
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that the equityholders' "option value" is 
nonincreasing in a. A rise in a shifts the entire probability distribution of Vn 
downward and so reduces Vn - D in the expression for the equityholders' 
"option value" in (13). In all states of the world, that is, for any k, the 
derivative of vn- D with respect to a will be -(n- 1). Recalling that VEL= 
VEn and L = Vn, and using Lemma A1, then 
(A5) 
Thus, a will have no effect if Pr(Vn > D) = 0 already. That is, by (15), an 
increase in a will reduce the "option value" until a ~ 8 + (V1 - D)l(n - 1). 
Then the "option value" will be 0, and further increases in a will have no 
effect on it. 
It will be useful to place an upper limit on the absolute value of the negative 
effect of a on the "option value." By Lemma A2, Pr(Vn >D) can be at most 
!. Therefore, (A5) implies that the derivative of E 1 [VEn] with respect to a can 
range from 0 to -!(n - 1). 
Bargaining in Corporate Reorganization 277 
The full effect of a on the equityholders' share, unlike the effect of e or of 
D - VI, will also depend on an effect on the "efficiency gains" component, 
that is, the first term in (13). An increase in a has an unambiguously posi-
tive effect on this component of the equityholders' share: the derivative of 
ia(e + n - 1) with respect to a is i(e + n - 1). This effect will always be 
greater than the absolute value of the negative effect on the "option value" 
component in (13), because e > 0. • 
Proof of Proposition 5. By (15), the "option value" component of the 
equityholders' share will remain at 0 until n > 1 + (D - VI)/(8- a). Once n 
rises above this level, their expected round-n payoff rises above 0. Thus, at 
that point the "option value" increases in n. 
The "option value," however, will not be monotonically nondecreasing in 
n. Instead, it may decrease in particular cases. Note that EI[Vn] = VI -
a(n - 1), so that each unit increase inn causes the expected value of Vn to fall 
by a. Indeed, an increase from n = N ton = N + 1 will reduce the expected 
value of Vn, conditional on any particular VN, by the amount VN- EN[VN+ I] 
= a. Therefore, it is easy to construct cases in which the expected value of 
Vn, conditional on Vn > D, will fall with an increase from n = N ton = N + 
1. The equityholders' expected round n payoff will then fall, provided that 
Pr(Vn > D) does not rise. 
It will prove useful to place a ceiling on the absolute value of the negative 
effect that n may have on the equityholders' "option value." A unit rise inn 
cannot cause the expected value of Vn, conditional on Vn > D, to fall by more 
than a. Thus, a rise in n from N toN + 1 can reduce EdVEn] by at most 
a Pr(V N >D), because it can only reduce VEnin those states of the world in 
which Vn >D. Recall also that Lemma A2, with A = 0 and L = Vn, implies 
that Pr(Vn > D) can never exceed l and can equal l only if n is even. 
Therefore, if Pr(Vn >D) equals l, then a rise inn from N toN+ 1 results in 
an odd n, so the median V N +I is strictly less than D, and E I [VEn] must fall by 
strictly less than a Pr(Vn > D). Thus, a unit rise in n will cause the equity-
holders' "option value" to fall by an absolute value strictly less than la. 
To consider the effect of n upon the "efficiency gains" component, note that 
the derivative of ia(e + n - 1) with respect to n is la, which is unam-
biguously positive. This positive effect upon the "efficiency gains" compo-
nent of the equityholders' share must be greater than the absolute value of the 
negative effect upon the "option value" component. Thus, each unit increase 
in n must cause V£1 to increase. • 
Proof of Proposition 7. By the same reasoning used in Section 2.2-
backward induction from round n to round 1-the equityholders would obtain 
(4), that is, V£1 = ia(e + n - 1) + EI[VEn]. If L < Vn, however, then VEn 
will not equal VEL. Consider the reasoning used to derive (3) with respect to 
the financial distress costs, but substitute A for a, round n for round i, and 
liquidation for round i + 1. One can show that the party making the offer in 
round n would hold its opponent to its payoff from liquidation and thereby 
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obtain the surplus from avoiding liquidation, .A, plus its own payoff from 
liquidation. In liquidation, the equityholders would receive VEL = 
max(O, Vn - .A - D), and the debtholders would receive the complementary 
share VDL = L - VEL = vn - A - max(O, vn - A - D) = min(Vn - A,D). 
Each party would make the offer in round n (and thus capture the surplus .A) 
with probability!. In this case, E 1[VEn] =!.A+ E 1[VEL], and substituting this 
expression in ( 4) yields 
(A6) 
Consider the reasoning used to prove Lemma 1, but applied to L rather than to 
Vn. An analogous lemma implies that (A6) equals (16). • 
Proof of Proposition 8. The loss from liquidation, .A, affects VE1 through 
both the second and third terms in (16). Note that the derivative of L - D with 
respect to .A is -1 in any state of the world, that is, for any k. Therefore, using 
Lemma AI, 
- Pr(L >D). (A7) 
By (A7), the derivative of the third term, E 1[max(O, L- D)], with respect to 
.A, is - Pr(L > D). The derivative of the second term with respect to .A, 
however, equals ! . The positive effect on the second term would be greater 
than or equal to the absolute value of the negative effect on the third term, 
because by Lemma A2, Pr(L >D) ::s !. Therefore, VE1 is nondecreasing in .A. 
Moreover, if Pr(L >D)<!, then VE 1 is increasing in .A. Lemma A2-which 
states that if (D - VI) + a(n - 1) +A 2:: e, then Pr(L >D)< !-completes 
the proof. • 
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